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The role of error awareness in executive control and modification of behavior is not
fully understood. In line with many recent studies showing that conscious awareness
is unnecessary for numerous high-level processes such as strategic adjustments and
decision making, it was suggested that error detection can also take place unconsciously.
The Error Negativity (Ne) component, long established as a robust error-related
component that differentiates between correct responses and errors, was a fine candidate
to test this notion: if an Ne is elicited also by errors which are not consciously detected, it
would imply a subliminal process involved in error monitoring that does not necessarily
lead to conscious awareness of the error. Indeed, for the past decade, the repeated
finding of a similar Ne for errors which became aware and errors that did not achieve
awareness, compared to the smaller negativity elicited by correct responses (Correct
Response Negativity; CRN), has lent the Ne the prestigious status of an index of subliminal
error processing. However, there were several notable exceptions to these findings. The
study in the focus of this review (Shalgi and Deouell, 2012) sheds new light on both types
of previous results. We found that error detection as reflected by the Ne is correlated with
subjective awareness: when awareness (or more importantly lack thereof) is more strictly
determined using the wagering paradigm, no Ne is elicited without awareness. This
result effectively resolves the issue of why there are many conflicting findings regarding
the Ne and error awareness. The average Ne amplitude appears to be influenced by
individual criteria for error reporting and therefore, studies containing different mixtures
of participants who are more confident of their own performance or less confident, or
paradigms that either encourage or don’t encourage reporting low confidence errors will
show different results. Based on this evidence, it is no longer possible to unquestioningly
uphold the notion that the amplitude of the Ne is unrelated to subjective awareness, and
therefore, that errors are detected without conscious awareness.
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The human brain is wondrously efficient and
complex, but by no means perfect, and errors
are ubiquitous. Sometimes, we are acutely aware
of having made an error, leading to the “oops”
sensation, whereas at other times, errors go
unnoticed. The detection of errors is crucial
for successfully navigating through life and
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effectively performing tasks. Error detection
affords us the opportunity to modify behavior,
which is essential for learning. Error detection
may be particularly critical in high-risk tasks
such as operating machinery or driving a car,
where immediate error detection and correc-
tion can be vital to survival. What is not clear
is the extent to which error detection occurs
as a conscious or an unconscious process. For
example, is conscious error detection a precon-
dition for error correction or strategic adjust-
ment of future behavior? Reduced awareness of
errors has in fact been associated with a num-
ber of clinical conditions (ADHD, O’Connell
et al., 2009; psychopathy, Brazil et al., 2009;
drug addiction, Hester et al., 2009). Therefore, a
more thorough understanding of the conditions
under which errors reach consciousness and the
Subliminal processing
Many, if not most, of our mental
processes are inaccessible to conscious
introspection, that is, we have no
subjective experience of them. These
subliminal processes, which are not
available for explicit reporting, can be
manifested in behavior (for example in
post-error slowing) or by
neuroimaging techniques (for example
event-related potentials).
neural correlates of error awareness may also
Error processing
The study of how an error is processed
by the brain, under the assumption that
errors are processed differentially than
correct responses. It is debated whether
errors are specifically registered as
incorrect responses or are simply events
linked to a large response conflict.
Error awareness
The study of how an error becomes
recognized consciously. Unanswered
questions in the field of error
processing are: What brings about
awareness of certain errors but not of
others? Are errors which we are
unaware of making, subliminally
processed by the brain as errors at all?
Or are they simply considered correct
responses and not processed
differentially?
have a significant clinical value.
The question of how consciousness is
involved in error processing is interesting also
Event Related Potentials (ERPs)
The electrophysiological neural
response measured on the scalp which
is directly related to a specific sensory,
cognitive, or motor event (such as a
certain stimulus or a response to a
stimulus). Each ERP has a specific scalp
distribution, latency and polarity
(positive/negative) which defines it.
ERPs are extracted by time-locking the
raw EEG measurement to the triggering
event, and usually averaging over
several repetitions of the same event in
order to increase the signal-to-noise
ratio. Ideally, ERP components serve as
physiological indices of specific
cognitive functions.
because it is part of a much larger and profound
question about the role of conscious awareness
in our behavior. What function does conscious-
ness serve? One way to answer this question
is by elimination, that is, to ask what type of
operations can be carried out in the absence of
awareness. While it is generally accepted today
that several perceptual, emotional and cogni-
tive processes can run outside of awareness
(e.g., Pessoa, 2005; Pessiglione et al., 2007, 2008;
Bargh andMorsella, 2008; Sklar et al., 2012), it is
also a common assumption that executive con-
trol operations do require conscious awareness
for optimal performance (Mandler, 2002; Koch,
2004; Baars, 2005). This makes intuitive sense,
as we usually become aware of those aspects in
the internal or external environment that inter-
fere with or interrupt routine action, or that defy
our expectations and predictions, and errors,
especially in simple tasks, are paradigmatically
unexpected. Nevertheless, recent studies suggest
that even cognitive control processes can be ini-
tiated unconsciously in some circumstances (see
van Gaal and Lamme, 2012; van Gaal et al.,
2012; Hassin, 2013 for reviews on this topic).
Thus, the extent to which higher-level cognitive
functions such as error processing and strate-
gic adjustment of behavior can occur subcon-
sciously remains unclear.
Throughout this review, we differentiate
between two types of errors: Mistakes and
Slips (see Reason, 1990). Slips are defined as
errors that occur when the information needed
to make the correct response is available to
the decision making process (i.e., stimulus
processing can be completed given sufficient
time, and the task is understood). In contrast,
Mistakes are errors made when the information
or the algorithm needed to make the correct
response is insufficient. For example, a typo-
graphical error of a familiar word is a Slip, while
a wrong guess at the spelling of a novel word, or
in solving a complexmath problem, is aMistake.
In laboratory tasks, a Slip error could occur due
to fast responding when the stimuli was seen
but before it has been completely processed, or
due to momentary lapse of attention to the task,
and a Mistake could occur when the participant
blinks at the time of the stimulus or did not
fully understand the task. This implies that every
Slip error can potentially be detected, whereas
the same missing information that caused the
Mistake would also hinder its detection. In our
discussion of error processing in the brain, we
refer only to Slip type errors, as processing can
occur only in the presence of some information
regarding the correct response1.
ELECTROPHYSIOLOGICAL INDICES OF
ERROR PROCESSING
The scientific study of error monitoring began
during the 1960s with a series of psychophysics
studies. Rabbitt and co-workers’ pioneering
work established that error monitoring relies
on post-decision processing (e.g., Rabbitt, 1966,
2002; Rabbitt and Vyas, 1981). The in-depth
study of the physiological characteristics of error
processing began only two decades ago, with
the discovery of two response-locked event
related potentials (ERPs) that are enhanced fol-
lowing errors in contrast to correct responses.
The first of these, termed the Error Negativity
(Ne, Falkenstein et al., 1991; or ERN, Error-
Related Negativity, Gehring et al., 1993) is a
negative deflection in the ERP with a fronto-
central distribution that begins around the time
of the incorrect response2, and peaks roughly
50–100ms thereafter. At the time of the Ne,
1Slips may go undetected because of failures to note the
correct answer for a given trial, or because of failures to
note a subtle erroneous response made (e.g., when the eye
moves slightly in the wrong direction in an anti-saccade
task, before a corrective movement is executed). A spe-
cial type of errors that do not reach consciousness but are
implicitly corrected, such as movement errors corrected
by the cerebellum during sensory-motor adaptation will
not be discussed here.
2While the Ne usually begins before the actual response
time measured from a button press, it probably is more
closely locked to the incorrect electromyographic (EMG)
signal onset, which is not always measured in EEG
experiments.
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ERPs locked to correct responses typically show
a significantly smaller negativity termed the
Correct-Related Negativity (CRN; Ford, 1999;
Vidal et al., 2000). It has recently been sug-
gested using Independent Component Analysis
(ICA) and source localization that the Ne and
the CRN reflect the same underlying brain activ-
ity (Roger et al., 2010). The second error-related
component is termed the Error Positivity (Pe,
Falkenstein et al., 1991). The Pe is a more sus-
tained component, which is absent after cor-
rect responses and is maximal at centro-parietal
electrodes, peaking between 300 and 500ms
after the error. Both components appear inde-
pendently of stimulus or response modality
(Van ‘t Ent and Apkarian, 1999; Falkenstein
et al., 2000; Shalgi et al., 2009) and across a num-
ber of paradigms designed to elicit errors, such
as response inhibition tasks and choice reaction-
time tasks. Based on converging evidence from
different research methods, both components
were localized to the Anterior Cingulate Cortex
(ACC), albeit in different regions. The Ne is
thought to originate from the dorsal/caudal
ACC (ERP dipole localization: Dehaene et al.,
1994; van Boxtel et al., 2005; O’Connell et al.,
2007; LORETA: Herrmann et al., 2004; Trial-
by-trial couplings of EEG and fMRI signals:
Debener et al., 2005; Intracerebral recordings:
Brazdil et al., 2002; though see Agam et al.,
2011, for a more posterior location within the
ACC). The Pe was localized to a comparatively
more rostral region (van Veen and Carter, 2002;
van Boxtel et al., 2005 and O’Connell et al.,
2007, who also found contributions from the
precuneus). Although some recent studies have
questioned a direct relationship between the
ACC and the Ne (see Orr and Hester, 2012),
as a paralimbic area the ACC is uniquely posi-
tioned to integrate salient cognitive and emo-
tional information with motor responses. It is
active during the performance of complicated
tasks, especially those involving conflict, and is
thought to play a prominent role in the execu-
tive control of cognition (Botvinick et al., 2004;
Ridderinkhof et al., 2004). The Ne and Pe also
dissociate in their sensitivity to experimental
manipulations, pharmacological substances and
personality traits (for an overview, see Overbeek
et al., 2005) and are therefore thought to play
different roles in error processing. Due to its
early latency after the error, the Ne has been
linked to automatic, pre-conscious error mon-
itoring, while the Pe has usually been associated
with later conscious processes such as com-
pensatory adjustments, emotional appraisal and
mainly error awareness. However, the exact roles
of both the Ne and Pe are still a matter of debate.
This review will focus solely on the role of the Ne
with regard to error awareness.
ERROR AWARENESS AND THE Ne
The prevailing dogma for the past decade
has been that the errors we make are regis-
tered by our brain even if we are unaware of
them. Nieuwenhuis et al. (2001) showed that
the Ne was equally seen after errors which
subjects reported (henceforth “Aware Errors”),
and after errors that were unnoticed (hence-
forth “Unaware Errors”). This result was strik-
ing because it implied that the whole complex
and sophisticated sequence of processing—from
stimulus recognition, decision making, up to
the level of response selection and response
monitoring—can be completed “below the sur-
face.” That is, not only are stimuli and tasks pro-
cessed unconsciously up to the semantic level
(e.g., Costello et al., 2009; Mudrik et al., 2011;
for a review see Kouider and Dehaene, 2007),
but the brain also knows at a very early stage
(perhaps even before the response was actually
made) what should have been done regard-
ing the stimuli and what was actually done.
However, for some reason this information is
not always relayed to consciousness. This starkly
contradicts one of the most popular theories of
the function of conscious deliberation, which
is to deal with unexpected, non-routine situa-
tions (of which the error scenario is paradig-
matic), designing intentional strategies for their
handling, modifying behavior, and learning for
future occasions. Although a prior study linked
the Ne amplitude to subjective confidence of
the response (Scheffers and Coles, 2000), the
finding of equal amplitude Ne for aware and
unaware errors was replicated several times in
eleven different studies, including in our hands
(Endrass et al., 2005, 2007, 2012; O’Connell
et al., 2007, 2009; Pavone et al., 2009; Shalgi
et al., 2009; Shalgi andDeouell, 2010; Dhar et al.,
2011; Hughes and Yeung, 2011; for a review see
Wessel, 2012), and led to the pervasive notion
that errormonitoring, as reflected by the Ne, can
occur regardless of conscious awareness (e.g.,
Simons, 2009). The findings of these ERP stud-
ies were further supported by two event-related
fMRI studies, which showed that activation of
the ACC region associated with the generation
of the Ne did not differ between Aware and
Unaware Errors, while Aware Errors were associ-
ated with larger bilateral activation of prefrontal
and parietal regions (Hester et al., 2005), or left
anterior insula activity (Klein et al., 2007) com-
pared to Unaware Errors. However, as more evi-
dence accumulated, it became harder to ignore
the data showing that error processing might
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not occur without one being aware of the error.
Six ERP studies (Scheffers and Coles, 2000;
Maier et al., 2008; Steinhauser and Yeung, 2010;
Woodman, 2010; Hewig et al., 2011; Wessel
et al., 2011) showed that the Ne was signif-
icantly more negative for Aware Errors than
Unaware Errors and correct responses, and three
more studies which did not directly compare
Aware and Unaware Errors were consistent with
this notion (Praamstra et al., 2003; Pailing and
Segalowitz, 2004; Selimbeyoglu et al., 2012).
A simple explanation which would recon-
Wagering technique
A key problem of experiments that
investigate conscious and subliminal
processing is to objectively separate
those stimuli or events which
participants are consciously aware of
and those which they are unaware of,
due to the subjective nature of
consciousness. The wagering technique
is a method which has been proposed
to solve this problem. In every trial of
an experiment, after the response to
primary task, the participant is asked to
bet some money on whether their
response is correct. If they are correct,
they win this money; otherwise, they
lose it. The basic idea is that people who
know that they have information are
usually willing to bet on it; that is, they
are willing to “put their money where
their mouth is.” In terms of assessing
error awareness, the participants are
first asked to judge whether their
primary response was correct or
incorrect, and then asked to bet on that
judgment. In trials in which the
participant made an error and judges it
as correct, a high bet indicates that the
participant was indeed unaware of their
erroneous response, whereas a low bet
would indicate some awareness of the
error (of a trial that would otherwise be
classified as an unnoticed error). The
wagering method, by exploiting
people’s desire to make money, is a
more objective measure of awareness
than asking participants to explicitly
report on their confidence.
cile the difference between the results of the
two groups of studies might be that in those
studies which found no difference between
the Aware and Unaware Ne, many subjectively
Aware Errors were not reported. In such cases,
the group of trials designated “Unaware Errors”
would be “contaminated” by many Aware errors
with large Ne’s (see also Wessel, 2012). This
would result in a reduction of the difference
between the Aware and the Unaware Error ERPs
(which are the average of trials in each group),
becoming statistically insignificant. In fact, five
of the studies which found no effect of aware-
ness on the Ne, reported that its amplitude
was numerically larger for Aware compared to
Unaware Errors (Endrass et al., 2007; Shalgi
et al., 2009; Shalgi and Deouell, 2010; Dhar
et al., 2011; Hughes and Yeung, 2011; but see
O’Connell et al., 2007, for the opposite result).
However, there is no systematical difference
between the experimental design of the exper-
iments that did and did not find an effect of
awareness on the Ne that would cause a response
bias toward not signaling an error (see Wessel
et al., 2011). In addition, error awareness rates in
the different groups of studies were not notice-
ably different. Thus, the puzzle remained—can
the Ne be taken as a signature of error detection
which is independent of awareness of the error?
In his recent review of the relationship of the
Ne with error awareness, which summarized
thirteen studies, Wessel (2012) ruled out two
more hypotheses as possible explanations for
the presence or absence of error awareness
effects on the Ne amplitude in different studies:
(1) whether the stimuli were degraded or not in
the given studies, and (2) whether errors were
corrected or not (following Steinhauser and
Yeung, 2010, who proposed that the amplitude
of the Ne is an index of fast and automatic error
correction). As an alternative, Wessel (2012)
suggested that the studies that did not find a
significant difference between the Ne for Aware
and Unaware Errors but nevertheless, showed
a numerical difference, may have suffered from
low statistical power, increasing the probability
of a type-2 error, i.e., the probability of not
rejecting a null hypothesis, even though the
alternative hypothesis is true. In light of this
suggestion, Orr and Hester (2012) re-analyzed
the fMRI data of three studies of error aware-
ness, forming a composite sample of 56 subjects
to increase statistical power. In contrast to their
initial study (Hester et al., 2005, whose partici-
pants were included in this re-analysis), Orr and
Hester found that the error-related dorsal ACC
activity was significantly greater during Aware
Errors compared to Unaware Errors, supporting
the possibility that their initial null result was
due to low statistical power. However, there are
two important reasons to question the ability
of the low-power hypothesis to adequately
explain all the studies that failed to find an
awareness effect on the Ne. First, numerical
differences between Aware and Unaware Errors
were found only in a few of the studies (in fact
O’Connell et al., 2007, found a non-significant
difference in the opposite direction). Second
and most importantly, the finding of a similar
Ne for Aware and Unaware errors cannot be
viewed simply as a null result, because the
imperative finding in those studies is in fact that
Unaware Errors elicit a significant error-related
component compared to correct responses (see
Dhar et al., 2011, for an exception, and Endrass
et al., 2005, who did not measure the Ne of
correct responses).
The study in the focus of the current
review (Shalgi and Deouell, 2012) proposed
and empirically tested a solution to the above
debate, which explains both types of results
(difference/no difference between the Ne of
Aware and Unaware Errors). In a choice-
reaction time task, we asked our participants,
on every trial, to judge whether they were accu-
rate in their response or not (accuracy judg-
ment). Immediately following this decision, we
asked participants to bet money on their just-
made accuracy judgment (wagering technique;
Ullsperger et al., 2010). By examining the
amount of their bet we effectively gained a mea-
sure of their subjective confidence in whether
they were right or wrong in their accuracy judg-
ment. We found that when participants made
an error, yet were certain that they had not erred
(indicated by their willingness to bet high that
they had made a correct response), the Ne was
significantly smaller than when subjects made
an error, reported it, and were certain of it (bet-
ting high that they had indeed made an error).
Moreover, when subjects erred and were certain
that they did not, the Ne was comparable to
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the CRN elicited by correct responses of which
they were confident. Conversely, when subjects
were correct but were uncertain of their perfor-
mance (betting low on whether they were cor-
rect) or when they reported they erred but were
uncertain of it, an intermediate CRN/Ne was
elicited by all types of responses (Correct, Aware
Errors, and Unaware Errors). These findings
(schematized in Figure 1) suggest that the error
detection as reflected by the Ne is after all depen-
dent on subjective awareness of the error—when
the level of awareness is more strictly deter-
mined using the wagering paradigm3, no Ne is
elicited without awareness. Thus, the Ne cannot
be taken as evidence for error detection which is
independent of error awareness.
Under the framework of signal detection
theory (SDT; Green and Swets, 1966), both the
Signal detection theory
Borrowing from the field of
communications, SDTmodels our
ability to discern between
information-bearing patterns (the
signal) and irrelevant patterns (noise).
In the present case of error detection,
the signal would be an error, and the
“noise” refers to correct responses.
Under the assumption that the noise
signal has some probability distribution
of possible patterns and the signal has
another distribution, an observer needs
to make a decision for every pattern,
deciding whether it belongs to the noise
distribution or to the signal
distribution. Ambiguity arises when
some patterns may come from either
distribution, requiring a decision
criterion (or threshold). The criterion
specifies for which patterns the system
will make a “signal” or “no signal”
response, and depends on both the
physical properties of the signal and the
psychological state of the individual
(e.g., experience, expectations,
attention). For example, if a subject has
a conservative response criterion for
reporting errors, they may decide to
report one only when they are
absolutely sure that an error has been
made (that is, when there is no
ambiguity) and not report an error in
any other case. Conversely, if one has a
liberal criterion, they may report an
error any time they feel their
performance was less than perfect (that
is, for all cases of ambiguity). Within
this model, confidence may be
determined by the distance from the
decision threshold; the further away
one is from the one’s threshold, the
more confident is the decision.
3While the wagering technique has become popular in
the field of consciousness, it has also been criticized (e.g.,
Clifford et al., 2008; Fleming and Dolan, 2010; Sandberg
et al., 2010). Wagering related factors such as loss/risk
aversion or subjective monetary strategies were brought
up mainly to question the use of low bets as a signature
of low confidence. However, in our use of wagering these
concerns only serve to bolster the use of the high bets as
a relatively pure measure of high confidence (for exam-
ple, if subjects sometimes refrained from betting high due
to loss aversion, then trials with the highest bet would
undoubtedly be trials in which confidence in the accuracy
judgment was strong enough to overcome loss aversion).
Moreover, we did not directly compare between low and
high bets.
“signal” (in our case, the error signal) and the
background “noise” are associated with neu-
ronal activity patterns that have a probabilistic
distribution, and these distributions may over-
lap. This overlap creates ambiguous situations,
requiring the subjects to make a decision (in
the present case, to indicate that an error was
or wasn’t made), even though the evidence is
compatible with both options. SDT suggests
that subjects set a threshold (criterion), and
decide in favor of a “signal” only if the evi-
dence exceeds this criterion. Under this frame-
work, if subjects are conservative, they may
refrain from declaring an error, even though
there is a considerable evidence in favor of one
(Figure 2A). Where does the wagering tech-
nique come into play within this scenario? Even
if human subjects’ overt responses are based on
their personal criterion (which is presumed to
be stable within an experiment), they nonethe-
less make individual responses with different
degrees of confidence. The process of confi-
dence judgment is still debated (Clarke, 1959;
Kunimoto et al., 2001; Pleskac and Busemeyer,
2010; Maniscalco and Lau, 2012), and the
specific arguments are beyond the scope of
this review. However, consistent with models of
SDT addressing metacognitive judgments such
as error detection (Clarke, 1959; Maniscalco and
Lau, 2012; Rahnev et al., 2012), it seems rea-
sonable to assume that, for a given subject with
a set discrimination criterion, decisions made
with high confidence occur when ambiguity is
FIGURE 1 | Schematized results, based on Shalgi et al. (2009); Shalgi and Deouell (2012). In typical Ne studies,
nominally Unaware Errors may elicit an Ne-like response (broken blue line), which is similar or a little smaller than the
Ne elicited by Aware Errors (red line). However, when only errors which were confidently missed (a high bet on correct)
are considered, the response to Unaware Errors is similar to the CRN elicited by correct responses (black line).
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FIGURE 2 | Metacognitive signal detection model of error reporting. (A) The correct and error signal probability
distributions and the decision criteria for reporting an error (vertical dotted line). The distance between the peaks of
the distributions is the metacognitive d’ and defines the discriminability of an error from a correct response. In this
example, the criterion is conservative, meaning that the subject will report only errors whose signal has very little
overlap with the correct response signal. All other errors will be reported as “correct” as therefore, be classified as
Unaware Errors. (B) The relationship between the metacognitive criterion and the subject’s confidence, or betting
scheme. The further the signal is from the criterion, the higher the confidence in the metacognitive decision, and the
higher subjects will be willing to bet.
minimal. That is, when the signal in a given trial
is far from the decision criterion (Figure 2B), or
when the discriminability between the error and
no error condition is greater (larger metacogni-
tive d’)4. Note that here the confidencemeasured
is about the secondary decision (also known as
the “Type 2 decision,” see Galvin et al., 2003)
about the error signal (“did I make and error
or not”), and not about the initial decision
about the stimulus (“Type 1 decision”). Thus,
by examining only trials with high bets, one
can limit the analysis to trials where the sub-
jects were fully aware of the error, or, more
importantly, truly had no awareness of the error.
The results thus effectively resolve the issue
of why there are conflicting findings regard-
ing the Ne and error awareness, suggesting that
there may be a range of subjective experiences
4Indeed, our subjects varied considerably in their wager-
ing performance; some subjects bet mainly using the
highest bet and others mainly on the lowest amount,
suggesting different d’ for detecting errors.
of making an error, rather than an all-or-none
phenomenon. The Ne amplitude thus appears
to be influenced by the level of discriminability
(in signal detection terms) as well as the crite-
ria different individuals have for error report-
ing; studies containing different mixtures of
participants who are more or less conserva-
tive in their error reporting will yield differ-
ent results. Additionally, some paradigms may
either encourage subjects to report errors even
when they are less confident, while others may
discourage reporting low-confidence errors, also
affecting the results. Specifically, if something in
the design of the experiment, the task instruc-
tions, or an experimenter bias, encourages the
subjects to report errors only when they are
highly confident, or if because of random selec-
tion the subjects in the experiment are relatively
conservative, and no confidence measures are
used, many error trials classified as Unaware
Errors will in fact have some level of awareness,
thus increasing the amplitude of the Ne in the
putatively “unaware” category.
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Recently, a study by Steinhauser and Yeung
(2010) directly examined the effect of manipula-
tion of the error reporting criteria on the ampli-
tude of the Ne. The authors used a brightness
discrimination task and asked subjects to judge
whether they were right or wrong in every trial.
They used two different incentives to encourage
participants to adopt either a high (report an
error only if you are very sure) or a low crite-
rion for reporting their errors. Steinhauser and
Yeung’s main results were consistent with ours:
when the high criterion was imposed, the Ne
was significantly larger for Aware Errors than
Unaware Errors. Inconsistent with this (as well
as with our above predictions) there was no dif-
ference between the Ne elicited by Aware Errors
under the low and high criterion conditions.
It is hard to reconcile these two results, and
further experiments will be needed to reveal
whether the type of task (threshold discrimina-
tion of brightness vs. discrimination of highly
visible objects) is critical in determining the
effect of criterion on the Ne, or whether the
direct manipulation of error signaling crite-
rion (“Type 2 decision”) is indeed equivalent to
manipulating the subjective level of confidence
and awareness of the error. Putatively, once a
Type 2 criterion is set and an error signal is
elicited, if this criterion is crossed, confidence in
this Type 2 decision (a type of 3rd level decision)
may still be as variable, regardless of the initial
criterion.
THE FUNCTIONAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE Ne
Does the sensitivity of the Ne to subjective
error awareness contribute to the debate about
its functional significance? Three major models
have been suggested to explain the Ne: (1) Error
Detection (Falkenstein et al., 1991; Coles et al.,
2001), (2) Reinforcement Learning (Holroyd
and Coles, 2002) and (3) Conflict Detection
(Botvinick et al., 2004; Yeung et al., 2004).
According to the Error Detection account, a
dedicated module for detecting errors exists in
the brain. This module detects the mismatch
between the actual response committed and the
intended response, and the Ne is seen to reflect
the size of this mismatch. The Reinforcement
Learning theory also suggests a generic error
processing system, comprised of a compara-
tor and of a remedial action system. Upon
detecting an error, the comparator, located at
a subcortical level (the basal ganglia) trans-
mits a learning signal via the mesencephalic
dopaminergic system to the remedial action sys-
tem situated in the ACC, indicating that the
outcome of the current action was worse than
expected (negative reward). The Ne is generated
by the arrival of the error signal at the reme-
dial action system. According to this account,
the ACC does not monitor errors per se, but
uses the learning signal to adapt the response
selection process 5. According to the Conflict
Detection account, the Ne reflects the amount
of response conflict present after an error has
been committed. The post-error response con-
flict is a consequence of continued processing
of the stimulus that leads to post-error acti-
vation of the correct response and therefore,
conflict with the incorrect response just pro-
duced6. The presence of response conflict indi-
cates situations in which errors are likely to
occur and hence require attention. Our finding
of a larger Ne for confident errors seems to be
compatible with both the Error-Detection and
the Reinforcement Learning accounts. When an
error is certain, there should be a largemismatch
between the actual response and the required
response compared to an uncertain error (hence
larger error-detection signal), and indeed the
Ne amplitude is larger for certain than uncer-
tain errors. Concomitantly, evident errors are
probably considered worse outcomes (i.e., nega-
tive reward) than unsure errors, requiring read-
justments (hence learning). Are the results also
consistent with the Conflict Detection account?
Scheffers and Coles (2000) argued that Ne vari-
ation with subjective confidence argues against
this model. They reasoned that the largest con-
flict should occur when subjects were uncertain
of their primary response, whereas in fact, in
their hands and ours, uncertainty yields smaller
Ne. However, the relationship between confi-
dence and conflict is not straightforward in
our view. The response (associated with the
Ne/CRN) and the confidence judgment are
dissociated in time, and both stimulus and
5A recent study suggests that whenever an outcome of
an action violates expectancies, not necessarily related
to reward, the ACC appears to be engaged in evaluat-
ing the necessity of behavioral adaptation (Wessel et al.,
2012). Using both EEG and fMRI, Wessel and colleagues
established that the Ne and the novelty N2 which indexes
processing of generally infrequent or surprising stimuli
share a common neuroanatomical substrate in the ACC.
The authors thus suggest generalizing the Reinforcement
Learning theory of the Ne beyond reward expectancies.
However, as the definition of reward is highly flexible, one
can argue that novelty or surprise are rewarding (either
positively or negatively) and remain with the original
theory.
6Note that response conflict is different from perceptual
conflict. There are cases where the perceptual conflict is
large but the response conflict is small (e.g., Danielmeier
et al., 2009).
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response processing continue to evolve between
the primary response and the accuracy judg-
ment. In one scenario, a large conflict at the
time of the response may lead to uncertainty
regarding the response at the time the accu-
racy judgment is given. In another scenario,
the same conflict may have been fully resolved
by the time of the accuracy judgment, leading
to high certainty. Thus, confidence in accuracy
judgments does not correspond in a straight-
forward manner to high or low conflict at the
time of the response. Considering only the con-
fident responses however, it is conceivable that a
higher conflict occurred in cases of Aware Errors
(if both the correct and incorrect responses were
activated) than in the case of Unaware Errors
or Correct responses, in which one response,
either the correct or the incorrect one, dom-
inated. Therefore, in our view, the findings
of our recent experiment (Shalgi and Deouell,
2012) and those of Scheffers and Coles (2000)
do not unequivocally distinguish between the
Error Detection, Reinforcement Learning, and
the Conflict Detection hypotheses of the Ne.
They do however, challenge the notion of error
detection without awareness.
UNCONSCIOUS ERROR PROCESSING?
The latency of the Ne, immediately or even at
the same time as the commission of an error,
suggests that it must be based on quickly avail-
able feed-forward information and not require
other inputs such as proprioceptive or sensory
feedback (Allain et al., 2004; de Bruijn et al.,
2004; Mathalon et al., 2004). The early latency
is what led to the initial proposal that the
Ne was an index of automatic, unaware error
processing. This is because conscious aware-
ness is thought to be a slower process (Rabbitt,
2002), which comes about only after the accu-
mulating evidence about erroneous behavior,
based on numerous sources of information,
exceeds some threshold and activates sufficiently
large neural networks (Dehaene et al., 2006).
In this respect, the variation of the Ne with
the level of awareness of the error is surpris-
ing. We propose (in line with Wessel, 2012)
that the initial error signal indexed by the Ne
does not reflect error awareness per se, but
rather that it is a prerequisite of this process,
and thus, correlated with it. Possibly, if some
Ne is generated, a second, compound internal
error signal based on other sources of informa-
tion (including later events, such as proprio-
ceptive feedback, autonomic responses and sen-
sory input) may exceed the threshold for error
awareness.
Thus, as opposed to prevailing views, the
Ne seems to be correlated with, and possibly
a prerequisite to, awareness of an error. Does
this mean that without an Ne one cannot be
aware of an error? A very recent study by Charles
et al. (2013) suggests some types of aware-
ness can occur without eliciting an Ne. Their
results showed above-chance error awareness,
detected using a forced choice technique, to
stimuli that were effectively masked. For these
correctly detected (in fact guessed) errors, no
Ne was recorded. This finding was interpreted
in light of an extension of the dual-route model
of decision-making proposed by Del Cul et al.
(2009; Figure 3). According to the dual-route
model, two parallel routes, with different noise
levels and thresholds, accumulate sensory evi-
dence toward a categorical decision on the same
input stimulus. One is a fast, non-conscious sen-
sorimotor route (bottom row, Figure 3), and
one is a slower conscious decision route (high-
level route, top row). A motor response is emit-
ted by the route that first reaches its decision
threshold. Usually, we try to guide our actions
by our conscious intention, but sometimes our
actions start earlier through the fast route, and
then wemight slip andmake an error. According
to Charles et al. (2013), the Ne is generated as
a result of a discrepancy between the responses
FIGURE 3 | The dual-route model of decision making, based on Del Cul et al. (2009) as expanded by Charles
et al. (2013).
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computed by the two routes (the difference
between intended and executed action).
By this model, the Ne is generated only
when a conscious intention exists, i.e., when
the conscious route has crossed its threshold. If
no conscious intention is generated (e.g., when
the stimulus is below threshold), no compari-
son can be initiated, yet a “hunch,” generated
based on rudimentary (unconscious) evaluation
of evidence, might be used later for the above
chance guessing. Thus, the model can explain
both the correlation between error awareness
and the Ne when the stimulus is consciously
perceived, and attenuated above-chance error
awareness without an Ne when the stimulus
is not consciously perceived and forced-choice
error signaling is used.
METHODOLOGICAL IMPLICATIONS
Our findings underscore the importance of care-
ful evaluation when it comes to the treacherous
issue of conscious awareness vs. subliminal pro-
cessing Simply asking for subjective report is
notoriously unreliable. In signal detection the-
ory terms, it confounds discriminability (of an
error in our case) and the criterion for report-
ing. The wagering process we used does not
solve the problem altogether, but it provides a
way for determining the distance from the crite-
rion: reluctance to bet high suggests a decision
close to the criterion, and so the determination
of awareness in these trials is murky. In contrast,
willingness to bet high suggests the decision was
made well above the criterion, making the exact
position of the criterion less critical.
The addition of additional measures, like
wagering or the forced choice method, is often
cumbersome and disrupts the flow of the task
even more than simple accuracy judgments.
Therefore, an important next step in the study of
the Ne as an index of subjective error processing
is to identify those factors that influence over-
all error reporting (e.g., task difficulty, stimulus
ambiguity), and the individual differences (e.g.,
traits) that lead to variable error reporting.
CONCLUSION
Error awareness is a fascinating topic.
It underlies numerous philosophical and
cognitive-psychological questions such as the
possibility of acting without awareness (the
“zombie” mode; Koch and Crick, 2001) and
the meaning of awareness in executive func-
tion. In Shalgi and Deouell (2012), we presented
evidence that the error-related component pre-
viously taken as support for the existence of
subliminal error processing (the Ne) is actu-
ally modulated by subjective confidence that an
error has occurred, and in fact correlates with
conscious awareness of the error. This leaves us
with no clear-cut electrophysiological evidence
for the unconscious processing of errors.
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